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The Private Action Requirement  
Gerard N. Magliocca* 
The crucial issue in the ongoing litigation over the individual 
health insurance mandate is whether there is a constitutional distinc-
tion between the congressional regulation of action and inaction.1  
Critics of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act say that 
Congress lacks the authority under the Commerce Clause to make 
citizens buy health insurance against their will.2  The individual 
mandate, they contend, is not a regulation or a prohibition of econom-
ic activity, which fall within the commerce power.3  Instead, the re-
quirement is a regulation of inactivity (or compelled activity) that is 
unprecedented under the Commerce Clause and invalid.4  
                                                                                                                           
 * Samuel R. Rosen Professor of Law, Indiana University—Indianapolis.  I thank the orga-
nizers of the Symposium for inviting me to participate.  
 1 See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-2388, 2011 WL 2556039, at *14 (6th 
Cir. June 29, 2011) (“Thomas More argues that the minimum coverage provision exceeds Con-
gress’s power under the Commerce Clause because it regulates inactivity.  However, the text of 
the Commerce Clause does not acknowledge a constitutional distinction between activity and 
inactivity, and neither does the Supreme Court.”); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. 
Supp. 2d 598, 615 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“While this case raises a host of complex constitutional is-
sues, all seem to distill to the single question of whether or not Congress has the power to regu-
late — and tax — a citizen’s decision not to participate in interstate commerce.”). 
 2 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 242-44 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Re-
consideration Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (requiring all citizens, with 
limited exceptions, to have a certain level of health coverage or pay a penalty); Randy E. Bar-
nett, Commandeering the People:  Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate is Unconstitu-
tional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 607 (2010) (“Under this theory . . . Congress can mandate 
individuals do virtually anything at all on the grounds that the failure to engage in economic 
activity substantially affects interstate commerce.  Therefore, it would effectively obliterate, 
once and for all, the enumerated powers scheme that even the New Deal Court did not aban-
don.”). 
 3 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (stating that even if “activity be 
local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be 
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce”); see also 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26 (2005) (“Prohibiting the intrastate possession or manufacture 
of an article of commerce is a rational (and commonly utilized) means of regulating commerce in 
that product.”). 
 4 This Essay assumes that self-insurance does not constitute economic activity.  That 
conclusion, however, is far from clear.  See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 
1501(a)(2)(A) (“The requirement regulates activity that is commercial and economic in nature:  
 
2 FIU Law Review [6:1 
This Essay examines the proposed “private action” limitation on 
the commerce power and concludes that it is unsound.5  I use the term 
private action to describe the rationale advanced by foes of the indi-
vidual mandate because its closest analogy is the state action doctrine 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.6  In both cases, the argument is 
that federalism shields some kinds of inaction from congressional con-
trol.7  The legal challenge to the individual mandate does not suggest 
that there is fundamental right — applicable to the states and to Con-
gress — to be let alone with respect to health insurance.8  As a result, 
the Supreme Court must identify some convincing states’-rights inter-
est to draw a constitutional line between the regulation of private ac-
tion and inaction by Congress.9     
No such justification exists for health care.  While the states do 
face substantial costs if they set up the benefit exchanges that are re-
lated to the individual mandate, they can do nothing and force the 
federal government to bear that burden.10  In other words, there is no 
                                                                                                                           
economic and financial decisions about how and when health care is paid for, and when health 
insurance is purchased.”). 
 5 My Essay does not discuss the other legal arguments against the individual mandate, 
most notably the claim that the requirement can be supported by the taxing power.  If the Su-
preme Court concludes that the regulation of inactivity is impermissible under the Commerce 
Clause, it is probably not going to conclude that the same inaction can be reached via the impo-
sition of taxes or penalties.  
 6 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000) (reaffirming “the time-honored 
principle that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only state action”).  
 7 See id. at 620 (stating that limits such as state action “are necessary to prevent the Four-
teenth Amendment from obliterating the Framers’ carefully crafted balance of power between 
the States and the National Government”); see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883) 
(stating that the lack of a state action limitation would let “congress take the place of the state 
legislatures and . . . supersede them”). 
 8 To the extent that anyone is arguing that there is an unenumerated right that bars a 
state from making its citizens buy health insurance, that argument is without merit.  But cf. Vir-
ginia v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 615 (E.D. Va. 2010) (asserting, without citation, that the 
individual’s right to choose to participate in health insurance was at issue).  
 9 An unsound syllogism that supports distinguishing acts from omissions goes something 
like this: (1) the Commerce Clause must be limited; (2) the action/inaction distinction is a limit; 
and therefore (3) the Commerce Clause cannot reach inaction.  The problem with that reasoning 
is that there are other principled ways of restricting Congress.  See United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995) (concluding that there is a relevant difference between economic and non-
economic regulation for Commerce Clause purposes).  
 10 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1321(c), 124 
Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconsideration Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).  Of course, the states give up significant federal assistance if they 
refuse to set up the exchanges, see id. § 1311(a), but this does not raise a constitutional problem, 
see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987) (concluding that Congress has broad 
discretion under its Spending Clause authority to attach conditions to the receipt of federal 
funds).  
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“commandeering” of state officials.11  With respect to individuals, 
there is no reason to think that private inactivity (or at least health 
care inactivity) should be privileged from federal regulation.12  All of 
the arguments against conscripting citizens into buying insurance to 
solve the adverse selection problem in health insurance premiums 
apply with equal force against a similar state rule.13  While those ob-
jections are compelling from a policy perspective, they do not speak 
to the federalism issue and hence provide no basis for striking down 
the individual mandate. 
Part I explores how the health insurance requirement could be 
upheld without engaging the private action argument.  Part II rejects 
that evasive approach and uses the state action doctrine to probe the 
distinction between acts and omissions with respect to congressional 
authority before concluding that the individual mandate is valid.  
I.  APPLYING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
Opponents of the individual mandate are right to say that Con-
gress has never tried to use its Commerce Clause authority to regulate 
inaction until now.  When the Supreme Court reviews the constitu-
tional challenge to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
though, the Justices may conclude that this fact is irrelevant.  I want to 
canvass that possibility briefly before examining the proposed private 
action principle.14 
The first point is that no Commerce Clause case says that Con-
gress is limited to regulating action.  Under the “substantially affects” 
test, Congress can legislate on economic issues if a rational basis exists 
for concluding that an activity, in the aggregate, substantially affects 
interstate commerce.15  Although this standard uses the word “activi-
ty,” that could be explained as a reference to the presence of an action 
in each of those decisions, not as a limit on congressional authority.  
                                                                                                                           
 11 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (articulating the anti-commandeering 
principle); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (same).  As Part II explains, the anti-
commandeering cases basically just apply the state action rule to the Commerce Clause.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 25-26.  
 12 There is a stronger argument against federal regulation of inactivity that involves educa-
tion or family law, as those are subjects that the Supreme Court has marked out as traditional 
domains of the states.  See infra text accompanying notes 31-33.  
 13 For a skeptical view of how adverse selection works in the context of health care, see 
Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 
1223 (2004). 
 14 There are viable questions of standing and ripeness in the individual mandate litigation, 
as that provision does not come into effect until 2014.  See Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act § 1501(a).  This Essay, though, focuses only on the merits. 
 15 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005). 
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Furthermore, the substantially affects standard is broad enough to 
support the view that Congress just needs a rational basis to conclude 
that an activity is involved and that the judiciary must defer to that 
finding.16  Either way, the individual mandate could be upheld.  
Next, the Supreme Court could hold that requiring citizens to 
buy health insurance is just the means that Congress chose to exercise 
its Commerce Clause authority and that this choice is valid so long as 
it is rational.  This is a straightforward application of M’Culloch v. 
Maryland.17  Of course, the individual mandate could be viewed as an 
impermissible end rather than as a rational means, or one could say 
that private inaction does not come within the Necessary and Proper 
Clause any more than state inaction is covered by Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.18  Nevertheless, under M’Culloch Congress 
could be reasonably deemed the only body that can draw a constitu-
tional line between regulating activity and inactivity.   
Finally, Congress does regulate inaction (or mandate action) un-
der its other Article One, Section Eight powers, and that authority 
could just be extended to commerce.  Federal officials can force the 
unwilling to serve in the army, sit on juries, pay taxes, and fill out cen-
sus forms.19  These activities could be distinguished from the purchase 
of health insurance because they are longstanding practices or basic 
attributes of citizenship.  This begs the question, however, of what 
standard of review should apply to a contrary congressional decision.  
There is a rational basis for thinking that health care should be a fun-
damental right through legislation, and the right to get emergency 
care without regard to wealth is well established.20  Thus, the Supreme 
Court would have to say that heightened scrutiny applies to a congres-
sional determination that private inaction can be regulated under the 
Commerce Clause.  
In sum, just because the individual mandate is novel does not 
mean that it is unconstitutional.  An explanation must be developed 
for holding that private inaction is beyond the reach of the Commerce 
                                                                                                                           
 16 This interpretation of “substantially affects” is not as plausible as one that says that 
inactivity is within the reach of Congress, but the expansion of rational basis to cover the activity 
as well as its impact is not implausible.   
 17 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); see also United States v. Comstock, No. 08-1224, slip op. 
at 6 (U.S. May 17, 2010) (explaining that, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, “we look to 
see whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a 
constitutionally enumerated power”).  
 18 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; id. at amend. XIV, § 5. 
 19 See, e.g., Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (upholding the constitutionality 
of military conscription). 
 20 See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2010) 
(requiring hospitals that participate in Medicare and provide emergency care to accept anyone 
who needs treatment). 
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Clause.21  Since no personal right can supply that logic, the search for 
an answer turns to the only general concept that distinguishes action 
from inaction for congressional power: the state action doctrine.  
II.  STATE ACTION AND FEDERALISM 
While some constitutional provisions do prohibit Congress from 
regulating specific kinds of inaction, the state action requirement of 
the Fourteenth Amendment is the obvious point of comparison for 
assessing the validity of the individual mandate.22  The state action 
doctrine limits federal power to protect federalism, which is what the 
proposed private action rule must be trying to do since states are free 
to make citizens buy insurance.23  With respect to the health care 
choices of individuals, though, no federalism interest is involved the 
way that there is for education or family law.24  Thus, the distinction 
between acts and omissions simply does not work in the context of a 
challenge to the individual mandate. 
State action is made up of two different strands.  The first in-
volves congressional regulation of state governments and officials.  In 
our federal system, there must be a limit to what Congress can order 
the states to do.  The Court crystallized this idea in its anti-
                                                                                                                           
 21 Of course, the reason could just be political.  I have written at length about “preemptive 
opinions” by the Supreme Court, which are decisions that reach out to decide unnecessary con-
stitutional issues in an extraordinarily broad fashion to inflict partisan damage on a popular 
movement.  See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, THE TRAGEDY OF WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN: 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE POLITICS OF BACKLASH 71-72 (2011) (exploring this pheno-
menon).  The individual mandate may receive this kind of treatment from the Justices, but that 
cannot be assessed yet. 
 22 See U.S. CONST. amend. III (prohibiting the quartering of troops in private homes dur-
ing peacetime); id. at amend. V (barring self-incrimination and the confiscation of private prop-
erty without just compensation); cf. id. at amend. XIII (barring compulsory labor).  The problem 
with stringing these examples together into something more is that there are just as many in-
stances where Congress can draft citizens or their property.  See supra text accompanying note 
19.  
 23 Randy Barnett argues that the individual mandate violates the popular sovereignty 
protected by the Tenth Amendment.  See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.”); Barnett, supra note 2, at 629 (“[I]f imposing mandates on 
state legislatures and executives intrudes improperly into state sovereignty, might mandating the 
people improperly infringe on popular sovereignty?”).   
One way of understanding Professor Barnett’s claim is that the limit on congressional regu-
lation of private inaction is an unincorporated fundamental right, which would allow states to 
regulate in this area.  An unincorporated right that is unenumerated, though, makes sense only if 
there is a federalism basis for having one rule for the federal government and another for the 
states.  
 24 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (2000) (rejecting a broad reading of 
the Commerce Clause because it might “be applied equally as well to family law and other areas 
of traditional state regulation”); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565-66 (1995) 
(expressing concern about the potential congressional micromanagement of schools).  
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commandeering cases, which hold that state legislatures and executive 
officials cannot be conscripted into service to administer a federal 
program.25  Anti-commandeering is basically just the extension of the 
state action rule to the Commerce Clause, but that aspect of the doc-
trine is not relevant to the individual mandate.26 
The other thread of state action is directed at private conduct 
that Congress cannot regulate.  With the enactment of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, this limitation on federal power was greatly diminished.27  
Indeed, the argument that private inaction is the new place to take a 
stand against the expansion of congressional authority concedes that 
the Commerce Clause can be extended over almost all private action.  
Put another way, there are hardly any substantive topics where the 
regulation of individuals presents a federalism limit that can be en-
forced by courts.28   
The most serious flaw in the argument against the individual 
mandate is that there is nothing special about private inaction from a 
states’-rights perspective.  Arguments about the flaws of the individu-
al mandate cannot be bootstrapped into a constitutional limit that 
applies only to Congress.29  The regulation of private inaction in cer-
tain sensitive areas might present a constitutional problem.30  One way 
                                                                                                                           
 25 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (addressing executive officials); New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (dealing with state legislatures). 
 26 I am troubled by the possibility that the costs of implementing the mandate might ex-
ceed the amount of federal assistance a state would receive if it elects to set up the exchanges, 
but that still involves a voluntary decision by the state.  The anti-commandeering cases do not 
contemplate a Spending Clause challenge.  Cf. Printz, 521 U.S. at 936 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(noting that Congress can use its power of the purse to induce state officials to carry out federal 
objectives).  
 27 See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241; Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 
241 (1964) (upholding the Act as a valid use of Commerce Clause power). 
 28 Granted, there is value in allowing states to experiment on controversial topics instead 
of having a single national standard.  But this is true for many substantive areas where the Court 
has rejected the view that federalism restricts the power of Congress to impose a uniform stan-
dard.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that Congress can prohibit the use 
of medical marijuana notwithstanding state law). 
 29 I agree with the criticism that the individual mandate is not a transparent way of cross-
subsidizing health insurance.  See Barnett, supra note 2, at 632 (“Rather than incur the political 
cost of imposing a general tax on the public using its tax powers, economic mandates allow 
Congress and the President to escape accountability for tax increases by compelling citizens to 
make payments directly to private companies.”).  The same charge, though, could be made 
against a state individual mandate. 
 30 It is worth pointing out that many congressional efforts to compel activity would involve 
state officials and thus face an anti-commandeering problem.  For instance, suppose Congress 
wanted to lengthen the public school year across the country.  That would draft students from 
work or recreation, but it would also impose regulatory obligations on schools and teachers that 
would be invalid absent the use of carrots (pursuant to the Spending Clause) to secure consent 
by the states.  
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to read United States v. Lopez31 and United States v. Morrison32 is that 
state law over action and inaction should have more scope in family 
law and education because they have traditionally been regulated by 
the states and deal with value choices that vary widely across states.33  
A federal statute that conscripts individuals in these fields (for exam-
ple, mandatory marriage counseling or a rule that children must read 
three hours a day) might well be problematic since there would be a 
federalism basis for striking such a law down.  
The individual mandate, though, is not in this category, since 
there is nothing to indicate that health care is a peculiar domain of 
state regulation.34  Federal involvement in medical treatment is perva-
sive and has been ever since Medicare was enacted during the 1960s.  
Private inaction does not itself provide a justification for rejecting the 
exercise of congressional power unless a personal right is involved or 
a substantial states’-rights principle is at stake.  The former is absent 
in this situation, and the latter cannot be derived from the precedents.  
Thus, I must conclude that the individual mandate should be upheld, 
even though I think that the decision to impose the requirement was a 
mistake.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
Whenever a new constitutional claim is advanced, it is easy to get 
caught up in the politics of the moment.  That is why this Essay as-
sessed the individual mandate by looking to the closest neutral prin-
ciple that distinguishes congressional regulation of action and inac-
tion.  A careful review of the state action doctrine reveals that the 
                                                                                                                           
 31 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 32 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 33 There is, of course, a significant federal role in these areas, but the point is that the 
Court has marked them out as subjects that might deserve some kind of different constitutional 
status.  The same cannot be said for health care. 
       34    The Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that health care is an area of traditional state regula-
tion cannot withstand scrutiny.  See Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Nos. 11-
11021, 11-11067, 2011 WL 3519178, at *58-61 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2011).  The Court relied heavily 
on the McCarren-Ferguson Act, which was enacted in the 1940s and was intended to preserve 
state autonomy over insurance regulation.  See id. at *59 (“The passage of the McCarren-
Ferguson Act signaled Congress’s recognition of the states’ historical role in regulating insur-
ance within their boundaries — and its unwillingness to supplant their vital function as a source of 
experimentation.”).  This citation was buttressed by a number of cases stating that “health” or 
“public health” is part of the states’ police power.  See id. at *60. 
  Something important is missing from this analysis: Medicare.  Congress ousted the 
states from the regulation of health care for senior citizens in the 1960s.  The fact that the Ele-
venth Circuit did not mention this massive program and its implications for federalism fatally 
undercuts its conclusion.  Health care regulation cannot be a traditional state function when the 
federal government is the exclusive source of insurance for the segment of the population that 
consumes most of the medicine. 
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claim that there should be a comparable private action limit on the 
Commerce Clause is without merit because it has nothing to do with 
protecting federalism under the Supreme Court’s cases. 
 
